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Under the felony-murder doctrine an unintended homicide is
murder if the offender is engaged in the perpetration or at-
tempted perpetration of certain dangerous felonies.1 Similarly,
the homicide is manslaughter when the offender is engaged in
any other felony or any "intentional misdemeanor directly af-
fecting the person."'2 These doctrines clearly come into play,
imposing automatic liability, where the fatal shot is fired or
blow is struck by the defendant or by one of his confederates
in the felony. In this situation the offender cannot urge the
defenses that he did not intend to kill or seriously injure the
victim, or that the homicide was committed by a confederate
without his approval. State v. Garner3 refused to extend the
felony-manslaughter doctrine to a situation where the fatal
bullet was fired in self-defense by the victim of a knife attack
(attempted murder). The limitation would similarly exclude
application of the felony-murder doctrine in cases where the
fatal injury is inflicted by a person who is defending against
or seeking to prevent one of the felonies which are enumerated
in clause (2) of the murder article.4 In sustaining the trial
court's refusal to apply the felony-manslaughter doctrine to the
accidental killing by a victim who fired in self-defense, the
Louisiana Supreme Court stressed the language of controlling
Article 31(2) (a) of the Criminal Code. This provision imposes
felony-manslaughter liability for an unintended killing "when
the offender is engaged in" a felony not enumerated in the
felony-murder provision of Article 30 (2). The term "offender,"
according to the Supreme Court, means "actual killer"; and the
actual killer in Garner was resisting, rather than perpetrating
or assisting in the perpetration of, the attempted murder. An-
other basis for the holding, suggested by a student note in this
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 14:30(2) (1950).
2. LA. R.S. 14:31(2)(a) (1950).
3. 238 La. 563, 115 So.2d 855 (1959), noted in 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
752 (1960).
4. LA. I.S. 14:30(2) (1950).
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Review, is by adoption of the "act or constructive act" doctrine.
According to this rule, which purports to avoid a too-embracive
application of the felony-murder rule, "one cannot be held re-
sponsible for a homicide attending a felony unless the fatal
act was actually or constructively his own and it cannot be
constructively his unless done by someone acting in concert
with him or in furtherance of a common purpose. From this
it follows that a felon could not be held for a homicide accom-
panying his crime if the fatal injury was inflicted by a weapon
in the hands of someone resisting the felony." 5 While the ac-
cidental homicide may have been proximately caused by the
defendant's felony, it is not the sort of situation where murder
or manslaughter liability should attach.
Insanity
The Louisiana Criminal Code continued the "right and wrong"
test of insanity at the time of the crime.6 This test, which has
been severely criticized by the psychiatrists, is still the law in
a majority of states because it provides a simple, workable
formula which the average jury can better understand than
such nebulous concepts as the recently announced "product"
test or the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which has been
approved by a number of states. 7 Thus the trial court's refusal,
in State v. Bickham,8 to instruct the jury to apply the "irre-
sistible impulse" test, was found to be in complete conformity
with the Louisiana statutory law.
State v. Stewart,9 noted in a prior issue of this Review,
continued the sound Louisiana rule that where the defense of
insanity at the time of the commission of the crime is urged,
the defendant has the burden of proving his alleged insanity -
but only by a preponderance of the evidence. This rule is
analytically and practically sound. "Inasmuch as sanity is the
normal condition of man and insanity an abnormal state, the
presumption is in the absence of anything to the contrary that
5. Note, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 752, 754 (1960), relying principally on
Commissioner v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905) (robbers not held for
felony-murder where the victim, shooting in self-defense, accidentally killed an
innocent bystander).
6. LA. R.S. 14:14 (1950).
7. For a full discussion of this problem see, Bennett, The Insanity Defense-
A. Perplexing Problem of Criminal Justice, 16 LoUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 484
(1956).
8. 239 La. 1094, 1122, 121 So.2d 207, 217 (1060).




all persons are sane and criminally responsible for their acts."",
The "preponderance of the evidence" rule has been elaborated
upon in State v. Scott as follows: "The preponderance of proof
is recognized as that of a character to satisfy the mind, though
it be not free from reasonable doubt. This preponderating proof
is enough in civil cases to authorize a finding in favor of the
party. The terms are constant in the administration of criminal
law."'" The defense of insanity is one which, as a practical
matter, cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt since
insanity "is not usually susceptible of such conclusive proof,
especially where the insanity is not continuing."'
12
Constitutionality of Criminal Statutes- Sufficient Certainty
The alleged unconstitutionality of the criminal statute, that
dernier resort of defense counsel in cases where the fact of the
violation has been established, was the principal ground of
appeal in three 1960 cases. These decisions serve further to
indicate the pattern of Supreme Court thinking as to how spe-
cific and detailed a criminal statute must be. In State v. Chris-
tine'3 a nightclub dancer was charged with obscenity in having
allegedly committed "an act of lewd and indecent dancing." The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that clause (3)
of the obscenity article14 was unconstitutional in that its pro-
hibition of the intentional performance in public "of any act of
lewdness or indecency, grossly scandalous and tending to de-
bauch the morals and manners of the people" was too vague
and indefinite. The statute must provide, according to the Su-
preme Court, an understandable rule and uniform standard to
guide the individual in his conduct. Compare, however, State v.
Hightower") where the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the drunken driving article of the Criminal Code, 16
which had generally defined the offense as "operating any motor
vehicle . . . while under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
S. ." In affirming the sufficiency of that definition Chief Jus-
tice Fournet pointed out that similar drunken driving statutes
have been universally adopted and stated "where the constitu-
10. 8 R.C.L. 175 (1915).
11. 49 La. Ann. 253, 254, 21 So. 271, 272 (1897).
12. Note, 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 749, 751 (1960).
13. 239 La. 259, 118 So.2d 403 (1960), noted 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
264 (1960).
14. LA. R.S. 14:106(3) (1950).
15. 238 La. 876, 116 So.2d 699 (1960).
16. LA. R.S. 14:98 (1950).
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tionality of such statutes has ever been challenged because of
indefiniteness or lack of intelligibility, the courts have upheld
them, reasoning that the terms . . . are commonly used terms
with a well-recognized meaning."'17 Continuing further, the
Chief Justice declared, "The terms 'intoxicated' or 'under the
influence of alcoholic beverages' have a certain and well-under-
stood meaning, i.e., a person is intoxicated within the provisions
of the statute when he does not have the normal use of his
physical and mental facilities by reason of the use of alcoholic
beverages (or narcotics), thus rendering such person incapable
of operating an automobile in a manner in which an ordinarily
prudent and cautious man in full possession of his facilities,
using reasonable care, would operate a motor vehicle under like
conditions.' 8 The difference between the Christine and High-
tower decisions does not lie in the fact that the drunken driving
article provides clearer specification of the proscribed criminal
conduct than clause (3) of the obscenity article. Rather, it lies
in the fact that greater preciseness of definition is required in
morality crimes - an area where the same standard of conduct
may vary greatly when interpreted by different individuals and
even between communities or groups of individuals. In City of
Shreveport v. Wilson19 the court stated that the term "lewd or
indecent act" was too vague and indefinite. In State v. Truby20
the court held that the word "immoral," as used in the crime of
keeping a disorderly place, was unconstitutionally vague and
indefinite. In State v. Kraft2' the phrase "indecent print" was
held so vague as to invalidate clause (2) of the obscenity article.
The 1950 legislature revised this clause so as to read "sexually
indecent print, ' 22 and this language has been held to be suf-
ficiently meaningful and definite. 23 Similarly, a 1960 statute
has amended clause (3) -going into great detail in particu-
larizing the proscribed criminal conduct- all of which must
be directed toward "arousing sexual desires" or toward pri-
marily appealing to "the prurient interest of the average
person. '24
17. 238 La. 876, 882, 116 So.2d 699, 701 (1960).
18. Id. at 885, 116 So.2d at 703.
19. 145 La. 906, 83 So. 186 (1919) (dictum).
20. 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758 (1947).
21. 214 La. 351, 37 So.2d 815 (1948).
22. La. Acts 1950, No. 314.
23. State v. Roth, 226 La. 1, 74 So.2d 392 (1954).
24. La. Acts 1960, No. 199. In the ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (2)
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957) the phrase "prurient interest" is further defined
as "a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion."
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State v. Vanicor,2 5 holding that the fish shocking prohibition
of the wild life and fisheries law which regulated the methods
of taking commercial fish was unconstitutional as being too
broad, vague, and uncertain, is more difficult to fully under-
stand and explain. Insofar as the Vanicor decision would re-
quire a specification of the circumstances indicating that the
electric device is possessed for the purpose of taking commercial
fish, it appears to set an almost impossible standard, especially
in an area of general criminal legislation where such specifica-
tion is not generally practical or required. The court's conclu-
sion that the statute was too broad in using the general phrase
"or electric device" is well taken, for as the court pointed out,
this would embrace many innocuous and useful devices such as
electric shavers, electric clocks, and radios. However, this ob-
jection should be limited to the 'unconstitutionally broad phrase,
and need not have been construed so as to invalidate the entire
statute. The possession of "any electric shocking machine" fully
met the test of definiteness and certainty.
Imprisonment in State Penitentiary Equivalent To
"Hard Labor"
Under the Louisiana Constitution 2 and the definition article
of the Criminal Code 27 the controlling consideration in determin-
ing the type of tribunal to try the case, or whether the offense
is a felony or a misdemeanor, is whether a convicted defendant
may be sentenced to "hard labor" for the crime. In State v.
Morgan28 the Supreme Court followed the well-established pat-
tern of the Louisiana practice and jurisprudence in holding that
a penalty clause calling for imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary for not more than three years was "in fact, though not in
precise words, 'imprisonment at hard labor'." Thus the violator
of the statute was entitled to be tried by a jury of twelve, which
is required when the crime charged is "necessarily punishable
with imprisonment at hard labor. '2
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Double Jeopardy
An interesting double jeopardy problem was nicely disposed
25. 239 La. 357, 118 So.2d 438 (1960).
26. LA. Const. art. I, § 9, art. VII, § 41.
27. LA. R.S. 14:2 (1950).
28. 238 La. 829, 846, 116 So.2d 682, 688 (1960).
29. LA. R.S. 15:338 (1950); LA CoNs'r. art. I, § 9, art. VII, § 41.
[Vol. XXI
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of in State v. Calvo30 where the court held that a prior prosecu-
tion for felony (robbery) -murder did not bar a subsequent trial
for simple robbery. The murder prosecution had been predicated
upon the theory that the homicide had occurred in perpetration
of the same robbery which was charged in the second trial. In
overruling the defendant's double jeopardy plea the Louisiana
Supreme Court stressed the facts that proof of robbery was
not essential to a murder conviction, and that a verdict of guilty
of simple robbery would not have been responsive to the murder
indictment. The Calvo decision also meets the "substantial iden-
tity" test of State v. Foster.31 Equally important is the prac-
tical consideration that the robbery and the homicide, while they
were incidental to one criminal transaction, were essentially
two criminal acts, i.e., the robbery and the killing of a human
being. The existence of some overlapping of the elements or
evidence does not necessarily result in singleness of criminal
liability. For example, the burglar who breaks into a house and
steals the owner's silver is guilty of two separate offenses. He
commits burglary when he enters the house with intent to steal,
and commits theft when he steals the silver.3 2
Extradition
The official papers which accompany the request for extra-
dition by the Governor of the demanding state must meet the
requirements of Article 160 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure.3 3 These include a certified copy of "a sworn state-
ment of facts by the prosecuting attorney" of the demanding
state. This statement of facts assures the Louisiana Governor
of information which will assist him in determining the pro-
priety of the extradition. In re Cecil Chelette, Extradition Pro-
ceedings34 held that it was not necessary for the prosecuting
attorney of the state seeking extradition to repeat in his sworn
statement facts already set out in other official documents which
accompanied the demand for extradition.3 5 In holding that the
sworn statement of facts requirement had been substantially
30. 240 La. 75, 121 So.2d 244 (1960).
31. 156 La. 891, 101 So. 255 (1924).
32. State v. Montcrieffe, 165 La. 296, 115 So. 493 (1928).
33. State ex rel. Covington v. Hughes, Sheriff, 157 La. 652, 102 So. 824
(1925).
34. 238 La. 683, 116 So.2d 293 (1959).
35. The accompanying documents containing these essential facts were the
prosecuting attorney's petition to the foreign Governor, his affidavit filed in the
foreign state and a copy of the information charging the offense.
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complied with Justice Hamlin pointed out that "An examination
of the documents of record manifests that they were properly
certified. They set forth all facts necessary for an understand-
ing of the matter involved. They were attached to the requisition
for extradition and were again properly certified therein. There
was certainly no necessity for the prosecuting attorney of Clark
County, Arkansas, to repeat in a sworn statement the facts set
out in (1) his petition to the Governor of Arkansas, (2) his
affidavit filed in the Circuit Court, Clark County, Arkansas,
and (3) the bill of information. Such would have been reitera-
tion and repetition. 3 0 The documents required by Article 160
are to assure the Louisiana Governor that a proper basis for
extradition exists and to provide him with the necessary in-
formation to exercise his discretion in the matter. Those objec-
tives were clearly and fully accomplished, and a slight variation
in the nature of the papers furnished was not permitted to serve
as a technical bar to an otherwise adequate requisition for extra-
dition. In re Chelette achieved a very sound and practical result.
Indictments
The statement of Article 227 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure that "it is immaterial whether the language of the statute
creating the offense or words unequivocally conveying the mean-
ing of the statute be used" has generally been held to authorize
the charging of a crime in the language of the statute.3 7 Apply-
ing this general principle the court upheld, in State v. Howard,38
an information which tracked the language of the public bribery
article, 39 and adapted it to "the specific facts on which the
charge was based - that the accused accepted a specific sum
of money from certain named persons on a specific date, and
that this money was given him to influence his conduct in rela-
tion to his position, employment, and duty as a police officer. '40
However, care must be employed in stating the crime, and there
are some crimes where the statute is so general in its nature
that tracking the language of the statute has been held insuf-
ficient. In State v. Blanchard4' the Supreme Court held that
an information charging that the defendants had "unlawfully
36. Id. at 689, 116 So.2d at 296.
37. State v. Scheuering, 226 La. 660, 76 So.2d 921, 924 (1954).
38. 238 La. 595, 116 So.2d 43 (1959).
39. LA. R.S. 14:118 (1950).
40. 238 La. 595, 600, 116 So.2d 43, 44 (1959).
41. 226 La. 1082, 78 So.2d 181 (1955).
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possessed a mechanically and/or manually operated device . . .
for the purpose of illegally taking commercial fish" was insuf-
ficient although it tracked the language of the statute. The
court reasoned that since illegal fishing devices may take any
of a great variety of forms it was necessary that the indictment
state the facts on which the charge was based. To charge the
crime by simply tracing the language of the statute in such a
case did no more than state a conclusion of law and could not
truly be said to inform the accused of the "nature and cause of
the accusation." Similarly, a charge of gambling has been held
inadequate when it followed the broad language of the multiple-
offense gambling article without specifying which of the many
forms of gambling had been committed.42
Bills of Exceptions
State v. May4" again stresses the importance of the defend-
ant's making sure that his bills of exceptions have been per-
fected by the signature of the trial judge before taking an ap-
peal. Even though the bills of exceptions had been ordered filed
by the trial court, the actual affixing of the judge's signature
was still necessary to validate the bills. With the taking of the
appeal the trial court had lost jurisdiction in the case, and.
Article 545 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "provides that
after an appeal has been granted '. . no further action in the
case can be taken by the trial judge; . . .' except that the Court
may render interlocutory orders and definitive judgments as
to matters of a ministerial nature and not in controversy on
appeal.... the signing of bills of exceptions is not the rendering
of an interlocutory order or a definitive judgment."' 44 The Su-
preme Court pointed out that Article 542 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, which grants additional time for appeal when the
trial judge delays in signing the bills of exceptions tendered,
him, provides relief from the dilatory conduct of the trial judge.
The rule that the trial judge loses jurisdiction over the case
upon the taking of an appeal has been inflexibly applied to deny
his authority to sign bills of exceptions in a case where the trial
judge had purported to grant an extension of time for the com-
pletion and presentation of the bills of exceptions. Even then,
42. State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23 So.2d 106 (1945).
43. 239 La. 1069, 121 So.2d 82 (1960).
44. Id. at 1073, 121 So.2d at 84.
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the signing of the bills was rendered impossible by the taking
of the appeal.
45
Appeal - Total Lack of Evidence
While the Louisiana Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
in criminal cases is limited to "questions of law alone,"4 6 the
court will review the facts of a case to determine if there was
no evidence in support of an essential element of the crime.47 As
one writer recently pointed out, "the determination of whether
there is some evidence or none has caused vigorous disagreement
among the Justices.' 48  State v. Linkletter" was just such a
case, and the majority determination, on rehearing, of "a total
lack of evidence to prove the guilt of Soldani" evidences a rather
liberal attitude toward review and reversal on this ground. There
was no evidence that he had actually participated in or helped
plan the burglary committed by Linkletter, Lacaze, and Mor-
rison. Three facts might have been considered as tieing Soldani
in with the crime, but these were explained away in Justice
Hamlin's majority opinion. Soldani was a partner with Link-
letter and Morrison in a novelty shop business, but there had
been no showing of any connection between that business and
the perpetration of the burglary. Soldani's automobile was used
by Linkletter and Lacaze to convey burglary equipment from a
rendezvous housing the equipment to the place of the crime,
but there was no evidence associating Soldani with the car at
the time of its illicit use. A separate abortive attempted robbery
of the Elks Club by Soldani had been his own independent ven-
ture. Use of Soldani's car was the factor principally relied upon
in Justice McCaleb's dissent 50 - as some evidence to support
Soldani's conviction. The line between no evidence and some
evidence is a very fine one in State v. Linkletter, and the deci-
sion appears to follow the liberal trend evidenced by the recent
holding in State v. Laborde.5 ' At any event the lack of evidence
was not as complete as in State v. Giangosso52 where the facts
45. State v. Dartez, 222 La. 9, 62 So.2d 83 (1952).
46. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
47. For a comprehensive study of the scope of this limited appellate review
of the facts, see Comment, Appellate Review on the Facts in a Criminal Case-
How Much Evidence is Some Evidence, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 843 (1959).
48. Id. at 846.
49. 239 La. 1000, 120 So.2d 835 (1960).
50. Justices McCaleb and Hawthorne dissented.
51. 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958).
52. 157 La. 360, 102 So. 429 (1924).
[Vol. XXI
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
certified by the trial judge showed that the defendant, convicted
of receiving stolen things, really owned them.
Effect of Plea Bargain Resulting in an Illegal Sentence
A perplexing problem was presented to the Supreme Court
in State v. Braud.53 The defendant was charged by two bills of
information with the sale and possession of narcotics. He
pleaded not guilty at arraignment. Subsequently, pursuant to a
plea bargain with the district attorney, he was allowed to with-
draw his not guilty plea and enter pleas of guilty of addiction.
The defendant was sentenced upon these pleas, with execution
suspended upon the condition of his entering a government
hospital for treatment, with which condition the defendant had
complied. Some months later the district attorney, upon being
informed by the court that the defendant had been sentenced
for a crime (addiction) with which he had never been charged,
filed a motion to set aside the judgment and sentences. The mo-
tion was granted by the lower court which restored the status
quo ante. Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court which, with
two concurring and two dissenting opinions, reversed the hold-
ing of the district court and reinstated the judgment and sen-
tences originally imposed.
The majority opinion was based upon a theory that the state
was either attempting to (1) arrest the judgment of the lower
court or (2) move for a new trial. Having characterized the
state's motion in this manner the majority adverted to Article
50654 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which prohibits the
state from moving for a new trial after the sentence, and to
Article 519 55 which states that the motion in arrest of judgment
must be filed between conviction and the imposition of sentence.
Thus the motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment
had not been appropriately filed by the state. Chief Justice
Fournet's concurring opinion was based upon the assumption
that the state's proper remedy was through appeal,56 and that
53. 238 La. 811, 116 So.2d 676 (1959).
54. "A new trial can not be ordered by the court on its own motion or upon
the application of the state, but may be granted with the consent of the district
attorney, whether the motion of defendant set out a valid reason for a new trial
or not." LA. R.S. 15:506 (1950).
55. "The motion in arrest of judgment can be filed only after verdict, but
must be disposed of before sentence." LA. R.S. 15:519 (1950).
56. The Chief Justice cited Article 527 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure which states, "When the sentence imposed is illegal, it may be re-
viewed either at the instance of the state or the defendant, in an appealable case
19611
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the time for taking an appeal had lapsed. Justice Hawthorne,
in another concurring opinion, stated that the law was with the
lower court, but that since the "equity" was with the defend-
ant he joined with the majority.8 7 Justice Hawthorne appeared
to find a sort of equitable estoppel, 5 i.e., that the defendant,
who had surrendered "substantial rights" and complied with
the conditions of the plea bargain, should not be deprived of
the anticipated benefits because of the neglect of the district
attorney. The district attorney had failed to nolle prosequi the
original bills of information charging sale and possession of
narcotics and to file bills charging addiction.5 9
Dissenting Justices McCaleb and Hamlin both stressed the
fact that a plea of guilty to addiction is not responsive to a
charge of sale and possession of narcotics, 60 rendering the plea
invalid. Article 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure plainly
states that "A valid sentence must rest upon a valid verdict,
indictment and statute, and everything essential to punishment
must be found by the verdict and alleged in the indictment."
Thus it logically follows that a valid sentence cannot be based
upon a plea that is not responsive to the crime charged in the
indictment. The lower court has the power to annul an illegal
conviction and sentence even when the defendant is actually
serving the sentence.01
State v. Mockosher,6- where the Supreme Court had recog-
nized the enforceability of a plea bargain, was not controlling -
for in Mockosher the plea of guilty had been validly entered.
Braud presented a situation where the defendant had been
charged with one crime and sentenced upon an invalid plea of
guilty of another distinct offense. Since the plea and sentence
were invalid, and could have been vacated on motion of the
defendant,6 3 it would seem that the plea bargain had failed, and
that the trial court was correct in setting aside the judgment
and sentences and restoring the status quo. A questionable
by appeal, in an unappealable case by certiorari and prohibition; provided that
nothing in this article contained shall be so construed as to deprive any person
of his right, in proper cases, to the writ of habeas corpus."
57. State v. Brand, 238 La. 811, 822, 116 So.2d 676, 680 (1960).
58. For the general nature and effect of a "plea bargain" see State v.
Mockosher, 205 La. 434, 438, 17 So.2d 575, 576 (1944).
59. 116 So.2d at 679.
60. State v. Robinson, 221 La. 19, 58 So.2d 408 (1952).
61. State ex rel. Cutrer v. Pitcher, 164 La. 1051, 115 So. 187 (1927).
62. 205 La. 434, 17 So.2d 575 (1944).
63. State v. Robinson, 221 La. 19, 58 So.2d 408 (1952).
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aspect of the analysis is, however, raised by the fact, stressed
by Justice Hawthorne, that the cause of the invalidity of the
plea entered by the defendant was the neglect of the district
attorney to take the proper steps to render the plea invalid, i.e.,
by withdrawing the bills of information charging sale and pos-
session of narcotics and filing an information charging addic-
tion. Thus the state may be estopped to set aside the sentence
and deprive the defendant of the sentence that would have been
validly imposed but for the district attorney's failure to file the
proper charge of addiction.
Reprieve
State ex rel. Melerine v. Trist 4 dealt with a confusing series
of reprieves granted in connection with the conviction of the
defendant in two cases. The facts are not as significant as the
rules announced. First, the court held that the original ninety-
day reprieve had not begun to run, according to its terms, until
the day on which the defendant was scheduled to begin his term
of imprisonment. It did not begin running upon the date that
the defendant's conviction and sentence became final and execu-
tory. Second, it was held that the defendant, who had already
begun to serve his sentence, could still be reprieved. The latter
holding was based on what the court termed the Governor's
"plenary power to grant reprieves," which is provided for in
Section 10 of Article V of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921,
and was in accord with Waggoner v. Cozard,6" decided in 1953.
Dissenting Justice Hamlin maintained that the pardon, which
requires a recommendation of the pardon board,6 was the only
proper method of executive clemency, once the defendant has
begun to serve his sentence. In support of the majority opinion,
however, it should be noted that the reprieve is a temporary
relief from execution of sentence, and serves a different purpose
than the pardon which completely relieves the defendant from
the penalty imposed. Even when the defendant has begun to
serve his sentence, there may still be appropriate occasions for
the Governor to grant a reprieve.
Justice Hamlin's dissent, on the first point as to when the
reprieve begins to run, has substantial merit. His argument was
64. 238 La. 853, 116 So.2d 691 (1959).
65. 222 La. 1039, 64 So.2d 424 (1953).
66. LA. R.S. 15:572 (1950).
19611
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that once the case had been affirmed on appeal and the time
for a rehearing had elapsed, it became the duty of the sheriff
to imprison the defendant. 67 When, as a result of the reprieve,
no attempt was made to arrest and incarcerate the defendant,
such non-action should not prevent the running of the reprieve.
Arrest and incarceration would not be justified after a reprieve
is granted, and it is illogical to hold that an attempt to do so is
essential in order to start the running of the time of the
reprieve.
67. LA. R.S. 15:656 (1950).
